The Spatial and Temporal Construction of Confidence in the Visual Scene by Graziano, Martin & Sigman, Mariano
The Spatial and Temporal Construction of Confidence in
the Visual Scene
Martin Graziano, Mariano Sigman*
Integrative Neuroscience Laboratory, Physics Department, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Abstract
Human subjects can report many items of a cluttered field a few hundred milliseconds after stimulus presentation. This
memory decays rapidly and after a second only 3 or 4 items can be stored in working memory. Here we compared the
dynamics of objective performance with a measure of subjective report and we observed that 1) Objective performance
beyond explicit subjective reports (blindsight) was significantly more pronounced within a short temporal interval and
within specific locations of the visual field which were robust across sessions 2) High confidence errors (false beliefs) were
largely confined to a small spatial window neighboring the cue. The size of this window did not change in time 3) Subjective
confidence showed a moderate but consistent decrease with time, independent of all other experimental factors. Our study
allowed us to asses quantitatively the temporal and spatial access to an objective response and to subjective reports.
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Introduction
A vast ensemble of stimuli are continuously being processed in
parallel by the sensory system, most of which elicit only a brief
transient sensory response which fades after few hundred
milliseconds without reaching working memory, executive control
and consciousness [1,2]. Determining what subset of this ensemble
accesses awareness and what determines this access has been, in
the course of the last years, a matter of intensive research. A
consistent qualitative observation is that the subset of conscious
information is significantly smaller than what would be inferred
either by direct introspection - as demonstrated for instance in
change blindness experiments - and by explicit behavioral
measures - as demonstrated for instance in subliminal priming
experiments [3–7]. Recently, several studies have shown that
introspective measures are highly reliable and thus that under-
standing which aspects of information processing are accessible to
introspection and which are opaque can be determined with
accurate quantitative precision, a methodology referred as
quantitative introspection [8–11].
Since the early experiments of Sperling [12], the partial report
paradigm, has been used to understand the dynamics of information
available for executive control and working memory. Sperling
showed that when observers saw briefly presented displays
composed of several alphanumeric characters, after a second only
a few (3 to 5) were available for working memory. However,
observers had a much better memory when required to identify a
specific subset of the characters at an interval (Inter Stimulus
Interval, ISI) after the presentation of the visual display. This
indicated the existence of a high capacity initial memory of the
stimulus display which decayed a few hundred milliseconds after
stimulus presentation, referred as Iconic Memory [13].
Here we perform a partial report experiment in which, in
addition, subjects reported the subjective confidence in their
response, as a direct measure of the conscious access to the
responded letter. We found a marked double dissociation between
objective response and subjective confidence: instances in which
subjects systematically responded correctly at very low confidence
and others in which subjects responded systematically incorrectly
with very high confidence in their response. These dissociations
followed a well determined dependence with temporal and spatial
properties of the stimuli, which allowed us to asses quantitatively
the temporal course of the elements of the visual scene available
for an objective response, and to consciousness.
Results
1- Experimental design and reliability of objective and
subjective measurements
In each trial participants saw – while maintaining fixation in a
cross at the center of the display - a circular twelve-letter array
which lasted 106 ms (Figure 1). At a variable ISI, ranging from 24
to 1000 ms following the stimulus presentation, a small red circle
was presented adjacent to a random location of the array which
indicated the position of the letter that had to be responded. The
cue was very small (12 times smaller than the average letter size)
and placed at a larger eccentricity than the stimuli to minimize the
possibility that it may induce masking of the target letters. The cue
remained visible until subjects responded. To assure that subjects
knew precisely the location of the cue, we performed a control
experiment (see methods, Cue Position Control Experiment). The
stimulus display was exactly as in the original experiment (fixation,
array of letters, cue). After completion of the trial, the screen
disappeared and after 1 sec, the subject was shown an array with
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Performance was 100% in this control experiment indicating that
subjects have perfect knowledge of the position of the cue.
Participants responded using a standard computer keyboard.
Followingthisinitialreport,participantshadtoreporttheconfidence
level of their response with an ad hoc bar placed at the center of the
screen (Figure 1). Participants indicated their confidence level in
percent ratings between 0% of confidence - when they thought they
were simply guessing - and 100% - when they were completely
certain of their response. Two participants performed 9 experimen-
tal sessions (of 576 trials each) in different days. Participants
performance decayed with ISI - as has been systematically reported
in previous partial report paradigm experiments [12]. This decay
could be observed in every individual session for both participants,
and the average dependence of the performance with ISI could be
fitted accurately by an exponential function - p   ~a:e {t=t ðÞ zb-
[14] for each individual subject (Subject 1, a:0 . 2 5 60.01, b:
0.2460.01, t:4 1 1 633 ms, R
2: 0.99; Subject 2, a: 0.1760.01, b:
0.1960.01, t:1 6 7 68m s ,R
2: 0.99).
The measure of confidence was surprisingly reliable across
different experimental sessions (Figure 1), almost determining a
fingerprint of each individual subject. Indeed, the distributions
were quite distinct for each subject (although roughly both were
bimodal with a minimum in the intermediate confidence values)
but, for each subject, this pattern was very reproducible across the
different sessions.
Figure 1. Experimental Design and reliability of measurements. A circular array of twelve letters was presented during 106 ms. Participants
fixated in a cross at the center of the array. After a delay (which varied randomly between 0 and 1 s), a small red circle (the cue) was presented in one
of the locations of the array indicating the letter that had to be responded. Then, participants had to report with the mouse the confidence level of
their response through an ad hoc bar placed at the center of the screen. The response ranged between 0% of Confidence (guessing) and 100%
(completely certain). The distribution of confidence reports are shown for every session of each subject at the Top-Right, showing a very high
reliability across sessions. Both subjects showed a robust exponential decay of performance with ISI (Bottom-Left).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004909.g001
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rately both in the objective and subjective tasks and thus that this
data was reliable to study quantitatively the interaction between
the content of iconic memory – as measured by explicit and
subjective reports.
2- Seeing and believing: Sources of information for
objective reports and subjective confidence
To quantify the relation between objective performance
(accuracy of the response) and participant’s subjective confidence
report, we binned the distribution of confidence report in four
percentile groups (25, 50, 75 and 100%), for each individual
session and participant (Figure 2A). Objective performance
strongly correlated with subjective confidence report (Figure 2D).
An ANOVA analysis showed a very significant effect of subjective
confidence on performance (F3, 8.13=47.45, P=0.0026).
To explore possible dissociations between objective and
subjective measurements, we explored the distribution of subjec-
tive confidence reports for error trials (Figure 2B). This
distribution, while biased to low confidence scores, shows for both
participants a bimodal distribution with a shape very similar to the
one observed in the distribution confidence for all (correct and
error) trials (Figure 2A). This indicates the existence of a
substantial amount of trials in which participant’s response is
incorrect and yet they are very certain about their response. We
refer to the error trials in which the subjective confidence score is
within the highest 25% percentile as high-confidence errors (green
trace) and similarly as low-confidence errors to the error trials in which
the subjective confidence score is in the lowest 25% percentile
(blue trace).
To understand the mechanisms which may lead to the
paradoxical high-confidence errors, we explored whether these trials
may result from the incorrect localization of an object whose
identity has been identified correctly, i.e. whether participants are
reporting the letter of a distractor which was present in the array
but not in the cued location. We found that in a very large fraction
of error trials (Subject 1, 77.1560.03%; Subject 2, 91.7760.04%)
participants responded a letter which was present in the array
(chance level is at 44%). To further explore whether this errors
may be clustered in space, we measured the distance between the
position in the array of the responded letter and the position of the
cue (Figure 2C). For this analysis we considered only the fraction
of trials in which the responded letter was presented in the array
and was not in the cued position. In these trials, the distance –
described in number of elements of the array - varies from 1
(immediate neighbor) to 6 (antipode). In correct trials – which are
not considered for this analysis - the distance is zero. We observed
that high-confidence errors involve mostly responses of letters adjacent
to the cued location and that the distribution of distance reaches a
plateau at a distance of 3 elements which corresponds to an angle
of 90 degrees, or simply a quadrant in the visual scene. The
fraction of low-confidence errors, on the contrary, showed a moderate
and progressive decrease with distance. The distance distribution
for high-confidence errors did not changed with time (for short and
long ISIs, inset Figure 2C).
These results indicate that participants may correctly identify a
letter, yet misattribute the location –within a relatively fixed and
bounded spatial window and independently of ISI. More
importantly, our results show that this misattribution is insufficient
to flag the error monitoring system [15], i.e. subjects were not
aware of the fact that they have made a mistake.
To further explore whether the spatial misattribution leading to
an error remains inaccessible to consciousness, we performed a
new experiment [see methods, Feedback Control Experiment] in
which we provided feedback to subjects in error trials in which the
responded letter was at a distance smaller than 3 from the target.
In these trials the subject was informed that he or she had made an
error and was asked whether the responded letter was clockwise or
anticlockwise from the cue. The results (performance - Subject 1:
4965%, Subject 2: 4364%) showed that subjects were completely
at chance indicating that even after an error had been flagged, and
subjects had responded to a close letter, they could not report the
spatial direction of the spatial miss-location.
Finally, we wanted to control whether the miss- location
between the responded letter and the cue involved the interaction
and competition (scrambling) of multiple letters in the cluttered
field or simply a drift in the position of the letter relative to the cue.
To address this issue we performed an additional control
experiment [see methods, Dot Probe Experiment]. The design
was identical to the main experiment, except that during the
display of the letters a small dot probe was presented on the inside
of the ring of letters. Subjects were then asked to perform a dual-
task: first to report the letter in the cued-location (as in the original
experiment) and then to report whether the dot was clockwise or
anti-clockwise respect to the cue. Performance in the location task
was virtually perfect in this experiment (.95% for both subjects, a
total of 120 trials) indicating that subjects can remember precisely
and without drift a single location during the experiment and thus
that location miss-attributions result from a complex interaction in
space and time of the multiple elements presented in the array.
Based on these results, in what follows we also studied
approximate responses (see for example,[16]), considering that a
response is approximately correct if subjects respond to a letter
which was presented at a distance shorter than three from the cued
location. This is as if the cue would not be considered a focal point
but rather a diffuse region in space which includes the neighboring
letters [17].
3- Correlations and dissociations between objective
performance and subjective confidence reports
Next we investigated whether experimental manipulations may
dissociate the objective performance and participant’s subjective
confidence report, by studying objective performance at a fixed
value of the subjective confidence score as a function of the critical
experimental variable – the ISI (Figure 2D). From simple
inspection of the curve, it can be seen that for low confidence
values, performance is better at short ISI (,130 ms) than at long ISI
(.500 ms). This difference vanishes for high confidence responses.
An ANOVA analysis revealed that the interaction between ISI
and Confidence was marginally significant (F3, 83=2.16,
P=0.0987), while the main effect of ISI was not significant (F1,
0.92=0.96, P=0.52). As mentioned in the previous section, the
main effect of Confidence in performance was highly significant
(F3, 8.13=47.45, P=0.0026). We then explored the effect of ISI
and Confidence and their interaction on approximate objective
performance. Similarly to what we had observed in the analysis of
exact responses, we found an increase in approximate perfor-
mance for short ISI only for low values of confidence. This effect
was comparatively more pronounced than for exact responses and
an ANOVA analysis revealed a significant interaction between ISI
and Confidence (F3, 83=4.63, P=0.0048). A post-hoc Bonferroni
Test comparing performance at short and long ISI for the lowest
confidence level shows a significant difference (p,,0.05),
indicating and effect of ISI at this confidence level.
This finding indicates that for short ISI values, a fraction of the
iconic buffer which includes a coarse spatial region covering the cue
may be accessible to bias the response, without affecting subjective
confidence. If subjective confidence could be proven to be indicative
Confidence in the Visual Scene
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ability to rout information from the sensory to the decision making
machinery in the absence of consciousness - decreases substantially
after a few hundred milliseconds. However, subjective confi-
dence is a complex construct and it is likely that different
situations – not necessarily directly related to the absence of
Figure 2. Correlations and Dissociations between objective and subjective reports. A) Confidence reports were grouped in four percentile
groups of confidence (25, 50, 75 and 100% - blue, orange, yellow and green traces) for each individual session and participant. B) Subjective
confidence distribution for incorrect responses (black dotted line). The blue and green traces indicate the low-confidence and high-confidence error
trials. C) Distance between the responded letter and the cue when the responded letter was a distractor for high- confidence (green) and low-
confidence (blue) errors. The inset shows that this distribution does not change for short and long ISIs. D) Mean performance increased with subject’s
confidence report. At low confidence, responses were more accurate for short ISI values. E and F) Control experiment in which subjects reported in
two subsequent screens the confidence in the position of the seen letter relative to the cue and of the identity of the seen letter for correct (E) and
error (F) trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004909.g002
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estimate. For instance, if subjects were certain about the letter
they report but uncertain about its position relative to the cue,
they will give low confidence ratings (knowing that the letter
may not be from the cued position) but they will still be correct
on many trials. This (location uncertainty) could thus explain
the increased performance for short ISIs at low confidence.
To disentangle these two possibilities, we performed another
experiment in which subjects were asked to report their confidence
on two different dimensions – letter identity and position of the
seen letter relative to the cue - in two successive screens [see
methods, Dual-Confidence Experiment]. We then represented this
data in a scatter plot of position vs. target-identity confidence
(Figure 2E–F). As in our previous result we observed that even for
correct responses, the confidence rating showed a broad dispersion
and were not clustered at high confidence ratings. In correct trials
we observed many instances in which subjects showed high
confidence for the position but not for letter-identity, and very
rarely the converse relation, i.e. trials in which subjects were
certain about the target they saw, but uncertain about their
position relative to the cue (Figure 2E). This was reversed in error
trials, where we observed that the distribution was biased towards
certainty about the reported letter but uncertain about its position
relative to the cue (Figure 2F). While not conclusive, this data
suggests that the low-confidence correct responses result from the
absence of awareness of target identity and thus relate to
blindsight, suggesting a short-time scale for this phenomenon.
In the next section we address the spatial specificity of this bias,
investigating the relation between the precise location of the cue,
of the responded letter and of the subjective rating of confidence.
4- Spatial biases: the spatial maps of forced-choice
responses and subjective confidence
As found in previous studies, here we observed consistent
differences in performance as a function of the position of the cue,
even in the absence of any task-related positions specificity, since
the cue appeared with equal probability in all locations [14]. The
left panels of Figure 3A show the performance for each individual
subject as a function of the location within the array, grouping the
data across all ISI values and letter identities. This bias in
performance was largely determined by a bias in the response – as
indicated by the maps of the position of the responded letter
(regardless of the position of the cue) which were very heavily
weighted towards certain specific positions of the array (Figure 3A,
right panels). To assess the reliability of this measurement, and to
investigate possible mechanisms which may lead to the spatial
inhomogeneity in performance, we explored the variability of the
spatial maps of responded letter for each individual subject in
different experimental sessions (Figure 3A, center panels). These
results showed that, for each subject, the pattern of responses
showed consistent regions with very high probability of response
(for instance participant 2 has a very strong bias to report the
stimulus presented at 3 and 9 o’clock). We also found several
positions which were virtually ‘‘blind’’ to both participants,
particularly in the lower hemi-field. This response bias was
remarkably stable as can be seen by the analysis of responses for
different experimental sessions, each performed in a different day.
Importantly, the position bias seems to be completely unconscious
as participants were unaware of the fact that they were responding
with unusually high probability to letters in specific locations of the
array.
This finding suggests that for a substantial amount of trials
subjects response is virtually independent of the position of the cue,
yet highly predictable due to an unconscious spatial bias in the
response. To understand whether the subjective confidence score
may identify these trials, we investigated the precise probability of
response for different positions of the cue and values of subjective
confidence. We measured, for each confidence level, the stimulus
response matrix P(Ri,Sj), where P(i,j) is determined by the
probability of responding the letter in position i (Ri) given that
the cue was in position j (Sj). The matrices for different levels of
subjective confidence are plotted, from left to right, in Figure 3B.
The lines represent the position of the cue and columns the
position of the responded letter. In this representation, elements in
the diagonal correspond to correct responses, elements close to the
diagonal to approximately correct responses and elements far from
the diagonal to error trials. The pattern for low confidence value
responses is very interesting: two vertical segments corresponding
to the right most location of the vertical meridian (column 3) which
is responded when the cue was presented in the right (lines 1 to 5)
and the left-most location of the vertical meridian (column 9)
which is responded when the cue was presented in the left (lines 7
to 11).
Quantitatively, this is reflected in the fact that – for low
subjective confidence values – the mutual information between
the stimulus and the response is 1 bit. This essentially signifies
that from a low-confidence report, an observer can determine
whether the position of the cue belongs to one of two categories
(the right or left hemi-field) from the participants’ response. The
mutual information increases substantially with the subjective
confidence report (ANOVA, F3, 3=14.29, P=0.0275) but even
at high levels of confidence it reaches value close to 2 bits
indicating that, on average, the ‘‘resolution’’ of a high
confidence report is of about three positions (67u of the array).
This can be seen qualitatively from the stimulus response matrix
at high confidence subjective ratings which shows responses
packed close to the diagonal, with a variability which varies
between 2 to 4 positions. This result is in line with our previous
finding of the existence of high confidence errors which involve
responses of elements of the array which were close to the cued
location.
5- The (short) temporal evolution of confidence
In the previous sections we showed evidence that the temporal
fading of information was distinct for objective performance and
subjective confidence rating. This finding could be related to
interactions between spatial, temporal and error rate variables.
In this last section, we study explicitly the evolution of
confidence in time as the other experimental factors are
maintained fixed.
We first analyzed the evolution of subjective confidence ratings
as a function of ISI, which shows a monotonic decrease. To
investigate whether there is a pure effect of time (independent of
the other factors which covariate with ISI) in the estimate of
confidence, we measured the mean confidence rate for correct
responses, and for trials with errors either proximal to the target
(d,3) or far from the target (d.3) or errors in which the
responded letter was not one of the distractors (Figure 4). The
function of confidence as a function of ISI for error trials are
roughly parallel indicating that there is a main effect of ISI but
without interaction between the different error types (ANOVA,
main effect of ISI, F7, 7=5.52, P=0.0193; main effect of error
type, F2, 1.94=15.14, P=0.0657; ISI * Error Type, F14, 309=0.89,
P=0.5718).
This suggests that, independently of all other factors, there is a
monotonic, roughly exponential, decay of subjective confidence
during the few hundred milliseconds between stimulus presentation
and the response.
Confidence in the Visual Scene
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 March 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 3 | e4909Figure 3. Spatial biases in response distributions and subjective confidence. A) Left panels: Mean performance (p*) across positions for
each subject. Center and Rigth panels: Probability of responding to a specific position in the array (independently of the position of the cue). Center:
Each column corresponds to a location in the array (Nth column refers to N o’clock position. Each line corresponds to a different session. Right: Data
collapsed across all sessions. B) Top Panel: Probability of responding to the location (i, in columns) given that the cue was in location (j, in lines), P(i,j).
The matrix P approaches the diagonal (correct responses) for increasing levels of subjective confidence. Bottom panel: P in a polar representation for
the lowest and highest subjective confidence. Mutual information of the distributions of the position of the cue and of responded letters increases
with confidence but does not saturate even for the highest confidence values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004909.g003
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Renewed attention from the neuroscience community has been
directed to quantitative studies of introspection, the measurement
of subjective confidence and its relation to objective measurements
[18–20][8,21,22]. In this study we used a partial report paradigm,
combined with an introspective report, to investigate, in a
quantitative manner, the spatial and temporal factors determining
the construction of subjective confidence reports. Our main
findings are: 1) Objective performance beyond explicit subjective
reports (blindsight) decreases substantially after short – less than
500 ms – temporal intervals. 2) The reversed situation of high
confidence errors in which subjects believe in an objectively
incorrect response were largely determined by spatial proximity. 3)
Low confidence errors were highly structured: responses were
heavily weighted to certain specific locations of the visual field,
which were very reliable within each subject for different sessions
and 4) Subjective confidence showed a moderate but consistent
decrease with time, independent of all other experimental factors.
Performance in a world of low subjective confidence: The
spatial and temporal windows of unconscious priming
As in many other studies, we found in this study evidence for
correct responses with low subjective confidence [5,10,21,23]. The
dual confidence report experiment further suggests that this results
from absence of awareness of target identity, thus constituting an
example of blindsight. Our results then suggest that the ability to
rout information from the sensory to the decision making
machinery in the absence of consciousness decreases substantially
after a few hundred milliseconds.
This is consistent with other lines of investigation predominantly
from the priming literature [24–26], from the trace and delay
operational conditional learning [27,28] and with theoretical
models of consciousness which argue that an important aspect of
consciousness it to maintain and broadcast information flexibly
across modalities, time and space [19,29,30]. Some studies
however suggest that unconscious primes may act on a less
flexible manner for longer durations. First, in priming experiments
exponential effects have been observed as a recurrent influence of
past trials on present behavior (inter-trial perserveration) in normal
subjects [31] as well as in brain-lesioned patients [32]. Second, in a
study combining a partial report with a change blindness
paradigm, it was found that the capacity measure (of deciding
the orientation of a rectangle) was between 6 and 7 items even at
about 1.5 seconds after stimulus presentation [33]. A theoretical
argument sustains that during this period subjects maintain a rich
and detailed phenomenal representation of the visual display
which is only partially accessible for report and thus cannot be
measured with our methodology [18]. Indeed, our results can only
reflect the accessible elements of consciousness and hence our
conclusions are agnostic to the existence of a richer phenomeno-
logical internal construction.
Our results also suggest that in the low subjective confidence
responses the response was heavily determined by stimuli
presented at very precise locations within the visual field. The
most interesting aspect of this observation is that subjects where
completely unaware of this fact, i.e. they did not report a conscious
strategy of reporting the sole letter of the array which they had
seen, even if it was not in the cued location. This suggests a
speculative but theoretically interesting line of thought: 1) the
‘‘chance’’ response is strongly conditioned by a prime, determined
by the letters that were contained in the array in the uncued
location (distractors) and 2) that the probability that a distractor
will act as a response prime is strongly determined by its spatial
location in the array. The first aspect of these observations presents
no surprise. An enormous number of reports, in different
circumstances have indicated that what appears to be a ‘‘random’’
response to a subject is conditioned by a previous unnoticed event
[14,23,24,34,35]. The second aspect is the most interesting one
since it suggests a very uneven weighting of the ‘‘priming
efficiency’’ of twelve letters presented at different angles of the
visual field. This distribution was indeed very reliable from session
to session within each subject and, showed consistency across
subjects: both showed a strong effect in the horizontal meridian
and a stronger tendency towards the right visual field, as expected
due to spatial allocation reading bias [36–38].
Correct and quasi-correct performance in a world of high
subjective confidence: The spatial resolution of conscious
report
A large literature has also addressed the construction of high-
confidence errors, mostly in relation to the creation of false
memories. More related to this study, high-confidence errors have
been shown to increase in cluttered fields, as demonstrated in an
Figure 4. The temporal evolution of confidence. Time course of subjective confidence responses after separating responses in correct (blue),
near (red) and far (purple) errors (in which the distance between the target and the cue was smaller/larger than three), and errors in which the
responded letter was neither the target nor the distractor (black). The subjective confidence decreases with time when spatial factors are factored
out.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004909.g004
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direction of the tilt of a target grating [39]. In our experiment we
could, as discussed previously, understand the nature of the errors
that result in high-confidence responses.
We observed that high-confidence errors involved mostly responses
of letters adjacent to the cued location and the distribution of
distance reached a plateau at a distance of three elements. Since
most of the observed variables in this experiment showed an effect
of ISI, we explored whether this distribution changed for long and
short ISI values. Interestingly, this distribution did not depend on
ISI, indicating that the misattribution in space does not result from
a progressive drift and loss of spatial resolution but, more likely, to
a coarse spatial access determined by the cue. Other experiments
have reported a related phenomenon, indicating that the visual
system can be correctly informed about target presence, yet be
misled about its actual location by constraints [40–42]. While in
these studies subjective confidence was not measured explicitly, in
most of these studies it is reported informally that subjects have a
very vivid perception of the illusory location. Also, in most of these
studies, the misattribution of location was interpreted in different
variants of ‘‘most-likelihood’’ estimates determined either by priors
or by geometrical constraints of the visual field. An interesting
aspect of this study is that the cue may act as an attractor of a
broader region in space, and within this relatively coarse kernel,
spatial precision is lost and thus subjects construct a high
confidence estimate of their response.
Previous studies on partial report task reported – as in this study
– a high fraction of localization errors. These previous studies have
used linear and for the most part smaller arrays [43–46] and thus
localization errors have been interpreted in terms of a foveal bias,
an incorrect localization of the cue or simply ‘‘guessing’’ in a small
subset [17,47,48]. In our design, in which all targets were
presented at equal eccentricity, with less likelihood of crowding
and with an easy labeling of the cued location during all the
decision process (the cue was present during that time and subjects
could report without confusion the position of the cue) this
rationale cannot explain localization errors. We tentatively suggest
that these localization errors – which were accompanied by a high
subjective confidence in the response and confined to a short
window of proximity to the cue - reflect intrinsic spatial limits on
the attentional resolution system and the allocation of top-down
control [49–51].
Materials and Methods
Participants
Two native Spanish speakers (1 male, 1 female) with an age of
24 and 27 years olds participated in this experiment. Both
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and
both were graduate students from Faculty of Exacts and Natural
Science, University of Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires, Argentina). All
participants gave written consent to participate in this study. One
of the participants MG – was an author.
Visual Stimuli and Procedure
Behavioral experiments were programmed in Python (www.
python.org). In each trial, twelve letters were presented simulta-
neously for 106 ms (corresponding to 9 frames with a refresh rate
of 85 Hz) on the screen following 600 ms of fixation. Stimuli were
presented on a 190 screen (resolution of 8006600 pixels) placed at
a distance of 73 cm. Letters fonts were uppercase Time New
Romans with a size of 1.2u. Letters were chosen randomly from
the alphabet (26 symbols), without repetition. The twelve letters
were arranged on a circle, around the fixation point at an
eccentricity of 5.2u. A red dot (0.1u) on an array of blue dots (with
the same configuration of the letters but at an eccentricity of 5.5u)
indicated the position of the target. Participants were asked to
report, using a standard keyboard, the letter presented in the
position cued by the red circle, which remains on screen until
subject’s response. Subsequently, participants had to report the
confidence of their response with and ad hoc bar placed in the
center of the screen and composed of 13 marks and two labels:
‘‘0% Confidence’’ and ‘‘100% Confidence’’ (‘‘0% Seguro’’ and
‘‘100% Seguro’’, in Spanish). The participants could move freely
the mouse to select the appropriated response. Eight Inter-
Stimulus-Intervals (ISI) were used (24, 71, 129, 200, 306, 506, 753
and 1000 ms). In all conditions, the cued stayed on the screen until
the subjective report bar was presented.
Each observer first completed a practice block of 96 trials before
the first session. In subsequent sessions, the practice block was
reduced to 30 trials. The participants that participated in this study
had previously be part of other similar experiment [14] and had
extensive practice in psychophysics experiments.
Subjects completed 9 sessions of 6 blocks each one (576 trials for
session). In each block all positions (total 12) and all ISIs (total of 8)
were randomly and uniformly sampled. Participants were
instructed to fixate in the center of the screen during the entire
experiment and to report the letter as fast as they could, within a
forced-choice between the 26 letters of the alphabet. Each session
lasted approximately 45 minutes and was performed in different
days.
We performed four control experiments which were different
variants of the main experiment described above. Each control
experiment involved a single session. The same participants which
completed the main experiment performed, in following sessions
the control experiments:
[Cue Position Control Experiment]
Participants performed 120 trials. The stimulus display was
exactly as in the original experiment. After completion of the trial,
the screen disappeared and after 1 sec, the subject was shown an
array with all the locations and asked to report position of the cue.
[Feedback Control Experiment]
Participants performed 576 trials, as in a regular session of the
main experiment. In error trials in which the distance was smaller
than 3, subjects were informed with a single tone that the trial was
incorrect. In a subsequent screen they were asked, in a two-forced
choice (responded with the index and middle finger of the right
hand) to report whether the responded letter was clockwise or
anticlockwise relative to the cue.
[Dot Probe Experiment]
Participants preformed 120 trials. The design was identical to
the main experiment, except that during the display of the letters a
small dot probe was presented on the inside of the ring of letters.
In a subsequent screen, following the trial, subjects were asked to
report (as in the previous experiment) whether the dot was
clockwise or anti-clockwise respect to the cue.
[Dual-Confidence Experiment].
Participants preformed 576 trials. The design was identical to
the main experiment, except that participants responded to two
consecutive subjective confidence estimates. They first indicated
the confidence that the responded letter was the letter they had
seen, and then the confidence that the responded letter was in the
position indicated by the cue.
Data Analysis
We conducted a longitudinal experiment in which we measured
performance for participants during repeated sessions (9 sessions).
All individual sessions showed a consistent decay of performance
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across sessions.
Performance data were corrected by false positives (FP), using
the following equation
p   ~
ratio of correct responses{FP
1{FP
FP defined as the response probability for a specific letter given
that it was not presented as the target. FP were calculated for each
individual letter, independent of the ISI value. FP were bellow 3%
for all conditions and thus corrected performance was not
substantially different than the non-corrected performance.
Introspection data for each session was normalized between 0
and 1 across session and participants.
Statistics. tatistics were done through Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) with subjects and sessions as random effects, and
assuming a normal distribution for the data. Post hoc analyses were
done through Bonferroni Test. In all tests, alpha level was 0.05.
Mutual Information Analysis. Mutual information was
calculated -for each confidence category and subject- through
the following equation:
Imutual~
X
cue
X
response
P cue,response ðÞ   log2
P cue,response ðÞ
P cue ðÞ   P response ðÞ
  
where P(cue) was the probability of target appearance in a specific
position (as the experiment is balanced, this probability is the same
for all target positions), P(response) is the probability to response
with a letter in a specific location in the array (i.e., the probability
to response a letter in position 1, independent of cue position), and
P(cue, response) is the probability to response a letter in a specific
position, with the cue presented at the same or a different (but
specific) location. The maximum value of Mutual Information (as
the limit of information that could be transmitted) for each
confidence category and subject was calculated as the minimum
value between the entropy of cue position and the entropy of
response position distribution.
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